Glossary
Forward Secrecy (PFS)
A property of secure protocols: every session gets its own throwaway keys, so recording traffic today and stealing the server’s key tomorrow still reveals nothing.
General definition
Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a property of a key agreement protocol: the session keys that encrypt traffic are derived from ephemeral values that both sides generate for that session and discard afterwards, rather than from a long-term private key. If the long-term key (for example the server’s TLS certificate key) is later stolen, it cannot be used to decrypt sessions that were recorded in the past, because the material that produced those session keys no longer exists anywhere. The word perfect in “perfect forward secrecy” is historical and adds nothing; the two terms mean the same thing.
Without forward secrecy an attacker can take the cheap route: capture encrypted traffic in bulk, store it, and wait for a key leak, a court order or a server breach to decrypt everything at once. Forward secrecy turns that into a per-session problem, which is why it became a baseline requirement:
- TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) removed static RSA key exchange entirely, so every handshake uses ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE or DHE) and forward secrecy is mandatory
- TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) has it only when the server selects an ECDHE or DHE cipher suite; servers still offering RSA key exchange do not
- Signal and OMEMO use the Double Ratchet, which derives a new message key for every message and deletes the old one, giving forward secrecy per message rather than per session; OMEMO 2 (XEP-0384) brings this to XMPP
- SSH, WireGuard and IPsec with IKEv2 all use ephemeral key agreement as the normal mode
Forward secrecy protects the past, not the future. If a device or server is compromised, traffic from that moment onward can be read until keys are replaced. The related property that handles recovery after a compromise is called post-compromise security, and the Double Ratchet provides that too by mixing fresh Diffie-Hellman values into every reply. Forward secrecy also says nothing about data at rest: a message stored in plaintext in a database is readable regardless of how it travelled. In a chat system, forward secrecy on the transport (encryption in transit) protects the hop between client and server; forward secrecy on the content itself requires end-to-end encryption with a ratcheting protocol.
In the Ethora ecosystem
Every Ethora transport runs over TLS: HTTPS for the API and file storage, WSS for the WebSocket, TLS on the XMPP streams into ejabberd and DTLS-SRTP for calls. With TLS 1.3 negotiated, each of those connections gets forward secrecy automatically; for TLS 1.2 clients the server-side cipher preference decides, and on a dedicated or self-hosted deployment that configuration belongs to you, together with the rest of your key management. Short-lived JWT chat tokens limit how long a captured credential stays useful, which is a related but separate control.
By default Ethora keeps a compliance archive: the server can read, retain, search, moderate and export messages, so forward secrecy applies to the transport, not to content stored on the server. Since release 2610 an app owner can switch on optional end-to-end encrypted rooms (OMEMO 2). Inside those rooms the Double Ratchet gives message bodies and attachments forward secrecy on the devices themselves, and the server never holds the keys. Metadata such as sender, room and reply references stays readable so push and routing keep working, and an encrypted room gives up server-side moderation, search, export and recovery, which is why it is opt-in per app rather than the default.