Glossary

Certificate Pinning

Instead of trusting the hundreds of certificate authorities on the device, a pinned app trusts one expected key. Strong against interception, unforgiving when the key changes.

General definition

Certificate Pinning hard-codes an expectation into the client: the TLS certificate presented by the server, or more usefully the hash of its Subject Public Key Info (SPKI), must match one of the pins shipped with the app. Normal TLS validation accepts any certificate that chains to a root in the operating system trust store, which on a phone means well over a hundred certificate authorities plus any that an enterprise profile or a malicious user has added. Pinning removes that trust in the CA system and replaces it with trust in a specific key, which defeats interception through a mis-issued certificate, a compromised CA or an installed proxy root.

Platforms support it natively: Android’s Network Security Configuration declares pins per domain in XML, iOS supports NSPinnedDomains in the app’s Info.plist since iOS 14, and HTTP client libraries such as OkHttp and helpers such as TrustKit offer the same for custom networking stacks. Pins should target the public key rather than the whole certificate, because a renewed certificate from the same key keeps working, and should include at least one backup pin for a key that is generated and stored offline.

The risk is operational. A certificate rotated to a new key that the shipped app does not know about turns every installed copy into a brick until users update, and app store review delays make that a multi-day outage. Browsers learned the lesson: HTTP Public Key Pinning (RFC 7469) was removed from Chrome in 2018 because misconfiguration locked sites out of their own domains. The modern replacements shift detection to the ecosystem instead of the client: Certificate Transparency (RFC 9162) logs every publicly issued certificate so mis-issuance is visible, short-lived certificates issued through ACME shrink the window in which a stolen key is useful, and CAA DNS records restrict which authorities may issue for a domain. Pinning still makes sense for a first-party mobile app talking to a backend whose key lifecycle the same team controls, with a pin expiry date and a remote kill switch to disable enforcement if rotation goes wrong. It adds nothing on its own to encryption in transit; it only narrows who the client will accept at the other end, the way mutual TLS narrows who the server will accept.

In the Ethora ecosystem

The Ethora native iOS and Android SDKs, the React Native component and the web component all connect to the host you configure: the managed cloud, or your own dedicated or self-hosted server on your own domain. Because the endpoint and its certificates belong to the integrator in the dedicated and self-hosted models, pinning is the integrator’s decision and is applied in the host application’s network layer using the platform mechanisms above, with the same caveats about backup pins and rotation. The SDKs do not require a particular certificate authority.

Pinning complements rather than replaces the platform’s transport security. Every Ethora connection, HTTPS for the API and files, WSS for the WebSocket, TLS on the XMPP streams and DTLS-SRTP for calls, is encrypted, and on a self-hosted deployment the certificate automation and cipher configuration are yours. The React Native SDK also encrypts its local cache at rest with AES-256 and keeps credentials in the platform Keychain or Keystore, which protects the device side once the network side is locked down. For the SDK overview see the Chat SDK page.

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