Glossary
Key Rotation
Secrets age badly. Rotation replaces every key, certificate and token before it has been around long enough to leak, and fast when you know it has.
General definition
Key Rotation is the scheduled or event-driven replacement of a cryptographic secret with a fresh one, followed by retirement of the old one. The schedule is called the cryptoperiod in NIST SP 800-57, and it is chosen by weighing how much data a key protects, how exposed it is and how expensive rotation is. Rotation limits three things: the amount of data encrypted under one key, the time an attacker who has stolen a key can use it, and the window in which a leaked secret in a log, a repository or a laptop backup still works.
Different secrets rotate in different ways:
- TLS certificates: automated issuance through ACME (RFC 8555) made 90-day and shorter certificate lifetimes normal; rotation is a deploy, not an event
- JWT signing keys: the issuer publishes its public keys in a JWKS (RFC 7517) with a key ID (
kid) on each token; a new key is added, new tokens are signed with it, and the old key is removed once every token signed with it has expired. Short token lifetimes make this fast - API tokens and secrets: generate the replacement, update the clients, then revoke the old token; a grace period in which both are valid avoids an outage
- Encryption-at-rest keys: with envelope encryption only the small data keys are re-wrapped under the new master key, so rotation does not require re-encrypting the whole dataset; cloud KMS products do this automatically on a yearly or shorter cycle
- End-to-end encryption keys: ratcheting protocols rotate message keys continuously, deriving a new one for every message so a compromise does not reach backwards
Rotation after exposure is the part people skip. A credential pasted into a chat, committed to git or found in a crash dump should be treated as burned and replaced within minutes, with the audit log checked for use of the old one in the meantime. Rotation only works if revocation does: a rotated key that is still accepted somewhere has not been rotated. Automation, short lifetimes and a known inventory of where each secret is used are what make rotation routine instead of risky; the broader lifecycle sits under key management.
In the Ethora ecosystem
Ethora separates long-lived and short-lived credentials so that routine rotation is cheap. A chat session authenticates with a short-lived JWT chat token that expires on its own, so a captured token stops working quickly without anyone revoking it. Server-to-server integration uses an app-level API token that the app owner can regenerate from the admin panel at any time, which is the rotation path after a suspected leak; with API-provisioned end users that token lives in your backend, not in the client apps.
At-rest keys and TLS certificates belong to the deployment. On a dedicated or self-hosted Ethora server they are issued and rotated under your own cloud KMS and certificate automation, and the compliance audit trail with immutable log export records administrative actions, so a rotation and any use of the old credential can be reviewed later. In optional end-to-end encrypted rooms, switched on per app, OMEMO 2 handles rotation on its own: the Double Ratchet derives a fresh key for each message on the users’ devices and the server never holds one.