Glossary
Secure Messaging
Messaging that regulated organisations can trust: encrypted in transit and at rest, gated by access controls, recorded in an audit trail and kept for exactly as long as policy says. The phrase hides a real design choice about who holds the keys.
General definition
Secure Messaging is the buyer’s term for chat that meets the security and compliance obligations of healthcare, finance, government and other regulated sectors. It is not a single technology. A messaging system is secure when several layers work together, and a vendor claiming the label should be able to say which of these it provides:
- Encryption in transit: TLS between every client and server, and between servers, so messages cannot be read on the network
- Encryption at rest: message stores, attachments, backups and device caches encrypted on disk
- Authentication and access control: verified identities, short-lived session tokens, single sign-on where needed, and room or role permissions that limit who sees what
- Audit trail: a tamper-evident record of who sent, read, exported or deleted what, available to compliance teams
- Retention and erasure controls: keeping messages as long as regulation requires and deleting them when it does not
- Data loss prevention: detecting and handling sensitive data shared in the wrong place
The layer that causes most confusion is end-to-end encryption (E2EE). In an E2EE system only the participants’ devices hold the keys, so the server cannot read the content. That is the strongest confidentiality guarantee against the operator, and it is the right design for consumer messengers. It also means the operator cannot archive, search, supervise or moderate the content, which conflicts with the record-keeping duties of regulated firms. The HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR 164.312) asks for access control, audit controls, integrity and transmission security; it does not require E2EE.
So there are two honest models of secure messaging. The E2EE model protects content from everyone including the provider, at the cost of server-side compliance functions. The compliance-archive model encrypts in transit and at rest but lets an authorised server archive, audit and moderate. Which one is secure depends on the threat model: a journalist protecting a source needs the first; a hospital or a broker-dealer that must retain and supervise communications usually needs the second.
In the Ethora ecosystem
Ethora deliberately implements the compliance-archive model. Traffic is protected with TLS in transit, data is encrypted at rest, the React Native SDK keeps its local message cache encrypted on the device with AES-256 and credentials in the Keychain or Keystore, and access is controlled through short-lived JWT chat tokens, App-level API tokens, room membership and admin panel roles. The server keeps a read-only message archive with configurable retention and per-user erasure, and every relevant action lands in a compliance audit trail with immutable log export.
Ethora does not offer client-side end-to-end encryption, and says so plainly, because its customers in healthcare, finance and insurance need to retain, supervise and moderate conversations. What removes the operator from the trust equation instead is deployment: on a dedicated or self-hosted server the whole stack, keys included, runs inside your own cloud account or data centre, and Ethora signs a DPA and, for US healthcare, a BAA on Enterprise and dedicated plans.